If we are to take jurisprudence at its word, the idea that the partylist system was constitutionally established in order for marginalized, underrepresented sectors to have a voice in Congress is false. According to the Supreme Court Decision in Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, the goal of the partylist system is to enable parties which do not have constituencies concentrated in a particular district to participate in elections. “While national, regional, and sectoral parties cannot expect to win in legislative district elections,” the decision says, “they can still garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections.”
According to Atong Paglaum, non-traditional parties are provided an “entry point to membership in the House of Representatives” through the partylist system. Nowhere in the 1987 Constitution, nor in Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 or the Partylist System Act, does it say that such parties need to represent “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. It is sufficient, according to the Court, that “the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform… regardless of their economic status.”
Yet while the legal reasoning is sound, its implications have been problematic.
Thirteen years since Atong Paglaum, watchdogs and academics have noted the “elite capture” of the partylist system. The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) reported that half of the 64 party-list representatives come from political clans. The International Center for Human Rights and Policy (ICHRP) likewise noted that at least 78 of the 156 partylists certified for the 2025 elections are linked to political families.
Even if not expressly designed to platform marginalized voices, the system remains open to criticism, as power is concentrated among a few. While debates on “elite capture” often focus on political dynasties, another equally significant group is overlooked: corporate executives.
How many CEOs do we need in the House?
In the 20th Congress, 15 out of 64 partylist representatives—over 20%—are primarily business executives, or company owners. These individuals come from industries such as agriculture, construction, pharmaceuticals, real estate, media, and energy. Their strong presence is striking in a system many still believe was designed for underrepresented sectors.
For sectoral partylists representing business interests, choosing a business professional is reasonable. However, of these 15, seven ran under regional partylists, while three represented organizations with broader advocacies like development, youth, or “marginalized representation.”
The presence of business executives in governance is not inherently problematic; but concerns arise when they dominate organizations not explicitly representing business sectors—especially when their companies hold government contracts or franchises. Similar to political dynasties, this form of “elite capture” raises questions about what partylists stand for, who controls them, and who ultimately represents them.
Cheapest seat in the House
Under current rules, forming a partylist is relatively easy. National and regional organizations qualify as political parties as long as they advocate an ideology or platform and nominate candidates.
In practice, this means almost anyone can create a partylist, adopt a catchy name, and secure a seat with around 250,000 votes. This low barrier has led to partylists named after celebrities, shows, and even government programs. These conditions make the partylist system attractive to businesses seeking influence in the House of Representatives, which determines funding and project allocation.
This dynamic can be seen in the case of former Ako Bicol Rep. Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest Inc., whose growth coincided with his tenure as House Appropriations Committee Chairperson. After winning a seat in the 20th Congress, Co later stepped down following his company’s implication in a corruption scandal involving flood control projects.
Although laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Conduct of Public Officials restrict conflicts of interest, enforcement gaps
remain—particularly regarding partylist candidates with business ties. According to PCIJ, not only did Magbubukid Partylist Rep. Ferdinand Beltran, Ferdstar Builders Inc., a government contractor, his campaign also reportedly received donations from a construction firm owned by his immediate family, also a company holding government contracts.
These disclosures come from official campaign finance reports. The issue becomes more complex when candidates control media or tech platforms which have paid campaign advertisements. This is the case with Angkas CEO George Royeca of the Angkasangga Partylist, as well as Brigada Group of Companies CEO and 1Tahanan Partylist Nominee Elmer Catulpos, who operates Brigada TV and 50 FM stations across
the country.
Without a thorough audit, it is impossible to know for sure how much was spent advertising their organizations on their own platforms during their campaigns. It becomes even more of a public concern when considering that both Angkas and Brigada are government franchise holders, and in the case of Catulpos, he also owns a Brigada Healthline and Brigada Pharmacy, whose products have been found by the Food and Drugs Authority to violate health and safety standards.
CEOs can represent anyone
The issue of partylist representation surfaced in recent Senate deliberations, particularly on nominee substitution. Experts argued that substituting nominees without valid grounds undermines transparency and voter trust, creating a disconnect between candidates and eventual officeholders.
This exposes deeper issues in nominee qualifications. Under the Partylist System Act, only youth sector representatives are required to belong to their sector. For others, it is enough to be a “bona fide member” of the organization for at least 90 days before the election. This means a party claiming to represent women need not nominate a woman; a Manila resident could represent Visayans; or a union-buster could represent workers.
In practice, this allows individuals—particularly those with resources—to create or fund partylists, position themselves as nominees, or install substitutes if needed.
Stopping Corporate-Elite Capture
Even if it was not originally designed solely for marginalized sectors, limiting access for the most powerful may still create space for the underrepresented in this system. But addressing elite capture requires expanding the conversation beyond political dynasties to include corporate influence, especially from businesses with government ties.
Both the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) and the Legal Network for Truthful Elections (LENTE) have called for stricter vetting and public hearings for partylist applicants. 9 This would ensure organizations and nominees have a verifiable track record in the sectors they claim to represent and prevent opportunistic “fly-by-night” groups.
Similar scrutiny should apply to nominees, from filing candidacy to substitution. This would reduce deceptive practices and improve accountability.
Transparency in business interests is also crucial. Candidates with ties to companies holding government contracts, franchises, or licenses should be disqualified, and undisclosed interests should lead to removal. Campaign donations should also be disclosed before elections to prevent quid pro quo arrangements.
Stricter rules may raise concerns about overregulation, but these must be balanced against the need to preserve the integrity of the partylist system. Already, it has been decided that the partylist system is not a tool for the marginalized to gain greater representation to balance elite interests. But a worse fate awaits: that it should be a tool for further elite domination and marginalization.
Vin N. Buenaagua is an electoral reform advocate. He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science degree from the University of the Philippines Diliman and holds a Juris Doctor degree from the San Beda College Alabang School of Law.
