

CHAPTER TWO

In Search of Credible Elections and Parties: The Philippine Paradox *

Temario C. Rivera

In the highly contested and conflictual process of Philippine democratization, at least two key features stand out: deeply flawed elections dominated by powerful political clans and weakly institutionalized, unstable political parties. Close to three decades after the end of dictatorial rule, these structural features, together with other related problems discussed in this book, stress the difficulty and uncertainty of the democratization process. From a comparative perspective, we know that the process of democratization can be stalled, challenged, and even reversed.

To understand and explain this problem in the Philippine context, this paper examines two major aspects of the democratization process—elections and political parties particularly since 1986. Since elections are commonly accepted as a necessary element of the political process in modern democratic systems, the first part of this study examines whether our electoral practices since 1987 meet what may be considered as the minimum procedural conditions for credible, legitimate elections. Secondly, using official results for Congressional and gubernatorial positions from 1986 to the 2010 elections, this paper identifies the key political families and clans in positions of power and

*The author appreciates the valuable comments of Felipe B. Miranda and participants in the seminar workshop on the democratization project held on 1 March 2011 at the Philippine Social Science Center, Quezon City. The author also gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided by Ms. Sahara P. Brahim and Ms. Farrah Grace V. Naparan.

explains the extraordinary resilience of these social forces in our political life. Thirdly, the paper investigates the impact on the electoral process and party formation of the key institutional reforms introduced after 1986, particularly the impact of presidential powers, the Party List system and term limits. Finally, consistent with this book's conceptualization and measurement of democracy as a system of governance where rulers are held publicly accountable for their actions by citizens (Schmitter and Karl 1991), this paper evaluates the nature of the accountability process as shown in electoral exercises and results.¹

Flawed Elections and Democratization

Most academic and journalistic accounts of the electoral and party system in the Philippines describe it as democratic. At times, the same system is conceded to be democratic but qualified as “elitist, weak, flawed, patrimonial, clientelist, unconsolidated, oligarchic, and a host of many other adjectives. This assumes that the country's political system, for all its weaknesses, at least continues to experience reasonably free, fair and competitive elections which are usually accepted as the minimum condition for qualifying a system of rule as a democracy. Relating the country's electoral exercises and its party system with the broader historical, political, and institutional context, this study finds this claim largely unsupported by the historical evidence. There are serious grounds to question the claim that elections in the country have been largely free, fair and competitive and that these practices including its party system can serve as accountability mechanisms in the relations between citizens, representatives and rulers.

Major accounts of the functioning of democratic, representative political systems include at least two main features: a system of free, fair and competitive elections to choose governing officials and a system by which rulers are held accountable for their public actions by citizens. In an often quoted definition of democracy, Schmitter and Karl put it this way:

Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. (1991:76)

Elections are the most visible public mechanism for choosing representatives in a democratic system. However, Schmitter and Karl also rightly alert us to the “fallacy of electoralism” in which elections are considered as a sufficient condition for the existence of democracy (1991: 78). Indeed, while

elections may be necessary conditions for the existence of a democratic system, there are all kinds of elections and not every electoral exercise qualifies as free, fair and competitive to make possible some degree of accountability.² Moreover, while elections may be one form by which public officials can be made accountable for their public actions, it is not clear how this mechanism can be effective especially in democratizing polities.³ As explained by O'Donnell:

Elections ...occur only periodically, and their effectiveness at securing vertical account-ability is unclear, especially given the inchoate party systems, high voter and party volatility, poorly defined issues, and sudden policy reversals that prevail in most new polyarchies (1998:113).

The country has one of the longest experiences of electoral politics among developing countries but this history is also steeped in cycles of electoral manipulation involving both fraud and violence. Thus, rather than being "convenient, practicable ways(s) of resolving conflicts without bloodshed and violence" (Przeworski 2003), elections in the country since 1987 have "progressively deteriorated into institutionalized seizures of political power by violence: the violence of money, murder, and deceit" as noted by O.D. Corpuz (1989: vol. 2, 575).

There is wide agreement among various authors about the most intractable problems confronting elections and parties in the Philippines: electoral exercises that have been overwhelmingly dominated by powerful political families (Gutierrez et al. 1992; Rivera 2002; Simbulan 2005); poor electoral governance as shown by the organizational ineptitude and lack of institutional autonomy of the Commission on Elections (Calimbahin 2010; CenPEG 2010); and weakly institutionalized, personalistic, and unstable political parties driven mainly by clientelistic rather than programmatic concerns (Montinola 1999; Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003; Manacsa and Tan 2005; Teehankee 2002; Velasco 2006; Kasuya 2009).

From the postwar period to the present, elections in the Philippines have suffered from destabilizing cycles of violence, coercion, and organized manipulation and fraud. Timberman summarizes these fraudulent and violence-driven electoral exercises in the postwar period thus:

In the 1946 presidential elections, the supporters of Manuel Roxas threatened an uprising if he lost. After the fraud ridden 1949 presidential elections, in which Jose P. Laurel never conceded defeat to Elpidio Quirino,⁴ the government had to suppress a minor revolt of Laurel's supporters in his home province of Batangas. In the wake of the fraud committed in 1949 the military was called out to guard the polling in the 1951 congressional elections. In the

1953 presidential contest Ramon Magsaysay's supporters planned a coup d'etat if he did not win. And in 1961, there was the threat of open violence when the incumbent Carlos Garcia, considered not yielding the presidency to Diosdado Macapagal (1991: 40-41).

Electoral violence and manipulation in the pre-martial law period reached unprecedented heights in the 1969 presidential reelection campaign of Ferdinand Marcos when the full range of the 3-Gs formula – “guns, goons, and gold” – for winning elections was deployed with impunity. Moreover, these flawed electoral exercises were also facilitated by the weakness of the country's institutional electoral governance as shown by the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) lack of independence and bureaucratic incompetence.⁵

With the dramatic demise of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, the resumption of electoral contests in 1987 did not put an end to the cycles of electoral crises besetting the country. Reflecting a deeper problem of the state's historic weakness in addressing basic problems of socio-economic development particularly in the face of a politicized military, unresolved armed challenges by communist and Muslim movements, as well as patronage-driven political warlordism, elections since 1987 have continued to show significant levels of violence and coercion, and new forms of vote manipulation and fraud. Undoubtedly in the post-martial law era, the most brazen projects to manipulate electoral results occurred in the 2004 presidential elections and the 2007 senatorial and local elections.⁶

In 2004, the legitimacy of the election of Mrs. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as president was widely doubted when she was wiretapped while communicating with one of the COMELEC commissioners, Virgilio Garcillano, in an attempt to ensure her election. Subsequently, she apologized for this act and later faced several failed impeachment proceedings in the House of Representatives. Moreover, the Mayuga Report of the military panel formed to investigate the involvement of military personnel in the 2004 election fraud included testimonies confirming that military officers were either pressured or served as accomplices in some of the fraud committed in Mindanao.⁷ These damning testimonies were provided by two high-ranking generals, Lt. Gen. Rodolfo C. Garcia and Brig. Gen. Raymundo Ferrer, and Lt. Col. Victoriano Pimentel.⁸ However, the Mayuga panel did not take these revelations seriously and ended up clearing all the top military officers linked to the systematic electoral fraud perpetrated in some of the Mindanao provinces in 2004.

In the 2007 senatorial elections, the systematic vote manipulation in Maguindanao province resulted in none of the opposition candidates making it to the top 12 winning slots in the province. Widely seen as an improbable result,

this vote-tampering in the province and other ARMM areas benefited the candidates of the ruling party. Moreover, the worst election-related violence also took place at Maguindanao province on November 23, 2009 with the massacre of 58 persons including 34 journalists.⁹ During election years, more deaths in fact are caused by election-related violence than by the usual encounters between the military and armed guerrillas of either the communist or Muslim insurgencies. Finally, the 2010 automated elections also did not put an end to the country's long history of electoral fraud despite the triumphalist pronouncements of the Commission on Elections.

Elections and Accountability

Accountability is important for the functioning of democratic systems because it “implies an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens...”(Schmitter 2004: 47). This recognition of an accountability process involving monitoring and sanctioning resources is all the more important in a democratic system where there is no guarantee that citizen's choices and policy preferences would be respected by governing rulers and representatives (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999: 40).

How are the peoples' interests represented in a democratic system and what role do elections play in this process? Manin et al. provide a succinct explanation (1999: 29):

The claim connecting democracy and representation is that under democracy governments are representative because they are elected: if elections are freely contested, if participation is widespread, and if citizens enjoy political liberties, then governments will act in the best interest of the people.

In this assumed virtuous cycle, what role do elections play? The same authors provide two models for understanding the role of elections. In the first model – a 'mandate' view –

“...elections serve to select good policies or policy-bearing politicians. Parties or candidates make policy proposals during campaigns and explain how these policies would affect citizen's welfare; citizens decide which of these proposals they want implemented and which politicians to charge with their implementation, and governments do implement them.” (Manin et al. 1999: 29).

In the second model, an - 'accountability view' -

“...elections serve to hold governments responsible for the results of their past actions. Because they anticipate the judgment of voters, governments are induced to choose policies that in their judgment will be positively evaluated by citizens at the time of the next election” (Manin et al. 1999: 29).

These authors also agree that these two views of elections are not necessarily exclusive since citizens can use their vote to choose policies and politicians (mandate view), to sanction the incumbent (accountability view) or vote simultaneously in both ways. However, they also concede that both views of elections are problematic. They point out that “representation is an issue because politicians have goals, interests, and values of their own, and they know things and undertake actions that citizens cannot observe or can monitor only at a cost” (Manin et al. 1999: 29).

James Fearon provides a third approach to understanding elections as a mechanism of democratic governance by arguing that these should not be seen as mechanisms of accountability or sanctioning devices. Instead, elections serve simply as “opportunities to choose a 'good type' of political leader, one who would act on their behalf independent of reelection incentives” (1999: 56). As Fearon notes, some examples of this kind of behavior would be the privileging of charisma in the choice of leaders or simply voting on the basis of warm feelings for a candidate. There exists a variety of both objective and subjective signals and measures about candidates in distinguishing between “good and bad types”. Fearon also agrees that viewing elections in terms of selection of good types is not incompatible with the sanctioning perspective since “successfully selecting for good types implies sanctioning bad types”.

These three views on elections all share the assumption that when citizens cast their vote, they are acting largely as free, independent, individuals in processes that are free and fair. However, these views on elections do not systematically take into account the social and political constraints that may in fact deter citizen-voters from expressing their preferred electoral choices or the structural constraints that limit choices to begin with. These constraints on voters' electoral choices are all too real in societies where power relationships are acutely unequal as seen in deeply rooted patronage-client ties or in the use of force and coercion by powerful elites to elicit desired political outcomes. Hence, elections may in fact function primarily to legitimize the rule by powerful elites skilled in the use of material incentives, co-optation and coercion.

Election-Related Violence and Private Armed Groups

The long history of election-related violence and the proliferation of private armed groups provide the first compelling reason for the failure of elections in the country to meet the minimum test of procedural fairness and credibility. Table 1 provides an accounting of election-related violence and deaths. While the figures show declining cases of election-related violence and deaths from 2004 to 2010, the reality is that many cases committed outside of the regular election period (120 days before election and 30 days after) are not included in the tally although these are clearly related to the electoral process. One recent study that examined cases of endemic electoral violence comprising 9 provinces and regions (Maguindanao, Abra, Lanao del Sur, Eastern Visayas, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Nueva Ecija, and Masbate) referred to this cycle of violence as “Democracy at Gunpoint” (Chua and Rimban 2011). But the more disturbing question is how we can even refer to our system as a “democracy” when much of its electoral contests continue to be perverted by outright violence and coercion.

Table 1: Election-Related Violence in the Philippines, 1986-2010.

Type of Election	Year	Violent Incidents	Deaths
Snap Presidential	1986	364	153
Local	1988	405	188
National & Local	1992	157	89
Congress & Local	1995	244	108
National & Local	1998	322	77
Congress & Local	2001	152	98
National & Local	2004	249	468
Congress & Local	2007	229	297
National & Local	2010	180	155

Source: Patino and Velasco 2004 (1986-2001 data); Vera Files 2011/Philippine National Police, 2004-2010 data.

Another glaring evidence of the difficulty of ensuring free and fair elections in the country lies in the proliferation of active private armed groups (PAGs) directly controlled by political clans. While these PAGs are known by the local authorities, the deep ties of patronage and clientelism that bind national and local politicians and their networks in the local military and police have enabled these groups to operate with impunity. A dreadful example of these patron-client ties that have nurtured and protected local warlords and their private armies is the Ampatuan clan's rise to power in Maguindanao. As a

government militiaman and paramilitary unit commander in the 1970s, Andal Ampatuan, Sr., the clan patriarch, rose to power initially through local positions as municipal officer-in-charge of his hometown during the Corazon Aquino administration and later as elected mayor. Having accumulated economic power “through the forcible and violent acquisition of land” and with his political network and the military's support, Ampatuan won the governorship of the province in 2001, getting reelected, unopposed, in 2004 and 2007. In the war against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) whose main support base is in Maguindanao, the government treated the Ampatuans as an ally, further expanding the clan's private armed groups (Arguillas 2011: 17-41). Demonstrating its ability to defy laws with impunity, the Ampatuans orchestrated the country's worst cases of electoral fraud and manipulation in the 2004 and 2007 elections, benefitting the ruling party and Mrs. Arroyo who ran for the presidency in 2004.

The pervasiveness of private armed groups in the country is documented by the findings of The Independent Commission Against Private Armies, a special government fact-finding body headed by Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa, retired associate justice of the Court of Appeals. In its 2010 report to President Arroyo, the Zeñarosa commission identified the PAGs active in each region and province and also provided estimates of loose, unlicensed firearms in each region. (See Table 2). However, the official data also underreports the number of PAGs since many of the official civilian groups armed by the military for counterinsurgency purposes often end up effectively under the control of powerful local politicians and can be activated for their private ends. Moreover, in some municipalities and provinces even the local police forces may actually function as PAGs or activated as such by powerful politicians who can buy their support or acquiescence in illegal operations through patronage networks.

Only two regions (NCR and Region 11) were reported not to have PAGs but the National Capital Region had the highest concentration of loose firearms (315,127) while Region 11 also had a significant amount at 49,178. The official data on loose firearms also tend to be on the low side since it cannot take full account of firearms controlled by armed groups and movements operating outside the pale of law. One significant information that emerges from these data is that the NCR rivals the ARMM in terms of the distribution of loose firearms relative to the population, with the former accounting for one firearm per 37 persons while the latter has one firearm per 36 persons. Not surprisingly, these deadly combination of PAGs and huge numbers of loose firearms are ready-made ingredients not only for election violence but also for ordinary criminality in the face of a weak state.

Table 2. Private Armed Groups and Loose Firearms by Region as of April 22, 2010.

Region	Number of Private Armed Groups	Number of Active Members	Estimate of Loose Firearms
NCR			315,127
Region 1	12	53	26,928
Region 2	6	65	32,168
Region 3	7	70	78,166
Region 4-A	9	45	101,758
Region 4-B	4	69	8,779
Region 5	15	146	28,587
Region 6	8	42	52,759
Region 7	2	17	52,727
Region 8	6	73	43,409
Region 9	4	49	45,969
Region 10	8	200	42,229
Region 11			49,178
Region 12	1	10	62,719
Region 13 (CARAGA)	1	7	43,957
CAR	4	77	11,628
ARMM	20	2856	114,189
Total	107	3,779	1,110,277

Source: PNP Reports as cited in The Independent Commission Against Private Armies, Report to the President, 2010. [also referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission]

In its report to the president, the Zeñarosa commission also identified the provinces with the highest number of PAGs and the leaders of such groups. (See Table 3). Predictably, the provinces with the highest number of active PAG members were in the five ARMM provinces (Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Lanao del Sur). Moreover, the poorer provinces and those with lower HDI (Human Development Index) rankings also harbor more PAGs as again illustrated by the ARMM situation. Reflecting its longer history of violent warfare and the special clientelist-patronage accommodations made by national politicians with the local warlords in the region, the ARMM, not surprisingly, continues to have the greatest concentration of PAGs.

In the crucible of war between the government and various armed groups in the region, old and new local politicians continue to nurture their own private armies with impunity. As also supported by the findings of the Zeñarosa commission, the worst situations are those in provinces where a number of rival political clans have their own PAGs and easy access to firearms, oftentimes facilitated by patronage ties with powerful national politicians. This situation is seen not only in the ARMM provinces but also in Abra, Camarines Sur, Samar, Zamboanga Sibugay, Cagayan, Masbate, Iloilo, Palawan, and Nueva Ecija.

Table 3: Provinces with the Highest Number of Private Armed Groups (PAGs) as of April 2010.

Province	Estimated Members of Active PAGs	PAG Leaders
Maguindanao	1,496	Ampatuan, Mangudadatu, Sumagka
Basilan	700	Akbar, Maturan, Kallahal, Hataman
Sulu	420	Tan, Loong, Abdurajak, Anni, Tulawie, Arbison, Daud
Lanao del Norte	180	Lantod, Mansueto, Macabangon, Alingan, Cabahug, Limbona, Palao
Tawi-Tawi	140	Sahali, Ali, Lee, Masdal, Asmah, Gogo
Lanao del Sur	100	Salic
Abra	77	Valera, Luna, Crisologo, Guzman
Camarines Sur	77	Villafuerte, Alfelor
Samar	63	Uy, Grey
Zamboanga Sibugay	49	Jalosjos, Famor, Lagas
Cagayan	43	Mamba, Fausto, Antiporda
Masbate	42	Seachon-Lanete, Kho, Bravo, Yuson, Bunan, Maristela, Abapo, Corpus
Iloilo	42	Mosqueda, Alipao, Malaga, Cordero, Lopez
Palawan	40	Reyes
Nueva Ecija	39	Joson, Gamilla, Salonga

Source: Adapted from Appendix F in *A Journey Towards H.O.P.E. (The Independent Commission Against Private Armies, Report to the President, 2010 [the Zeñarosa Commission]*

Another disturbing fact emerges from the commission data: PAGs continue to exist even in richer provinces with high human development rankings. However, political clans in these richer provinces have more varied resources other than the use of guns and brute power to pursue their electoral goals. The following provinces in the top 20 ranking for HDI in 2006 (human development indicators) had the following number of active members of PAGs: (see Table 4).

Table 4: High HDI-Ranked (Human Development Index) Provinces with Private Armed Groups as of April 2010.

Province	Number of Active Members of PAGs	HDI Rank (2006)
Cavite	34	3
La Union	18	10
Bulacan	20	11
Iloilo	42	12
Pangasinan	35	20

Source: Adapted from the Zeñarosa Commission (2010) and the Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009.

Aside from the continuing cases of electoral violence, the endemic flaws in the electoral system are further seen in the rampant practices of vote-buying, vote-padding and shaving (*dagdag-bawas*), voters' list rigged with ghost voters or double registrants, and overall weak electoral governance by the COMELEC.¹⁰ For instance, in 2011 Governor Esmael Mangudadatu of Maguindanao estimated that in his province “about 40-60 percent of the current number of registered voter registrants are either ghost voters or double registrants” (Quiros 2011: A17). COMELEC data also indicate unusually large increases in the numbers of registered voters in the ARMM and Lanao del Sur from 2007-2010 with the former showing an increase of 42 percent and the latter, 83 percent. As for the well-established practice of vote-buying, NAMFREL observed that in the automated 2010 elections “the going rate for vote-buying ran from a low of P500. to occasional reports of up to P5,000. The high rates were attributed to multiple candidates trying to buy a vote from a single voter.” (NAMFREL 2010)

Election Automation

Pursuant to a new law (Republic Act No. 9369) approved in 2007 that sought the automation of elections in the country, the COMELEC put in motion an automated election system (AES) in the May 2010 simultaneous national and local elections. With a bidding process marked by controversy involving disqualification of bidders and reconsiderations by COMELEC, the joint venture firm, Smartmatic-TIM, won the contract for the automation project after being initially disqualified. A Barbados-registered company, Smartmatic, in partnership with another company, SAHI Technology, Inc., also won the bid for the 2008 ARMM election automation project. While deemed a success by the COMELEC and government officials, the automated elections in 2008 at the ARMM was given an overall assessment rating of “Poor” by the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), an independent, international elections monitoring group. ANFREL noted rampant electoral fraud, including among others, pervasive vote-buying, casting of multiple votes and phantom votes, appointing relatives of local officials as Board of Election inspectors, cases of voters being confused by the new technology, and an overall atmosphere of fear with the pervasive presence of local officials in the voting precincts and restricted movement of people days immediately prior to the election (ANFREL 2010). Local civil society organizations such as the Center for Peoples' Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) and the Legal Network for Truthful Elections (LENTE) which sent observation teams to the 2008 ARMM elections also shared this negative overall assessment of the process (CenPEG 2008).

The radical shift to an automated election system on a national scale starting with the 2010 elections faced numerous problems ranging from legal and constitutional questions to procedural and technical ones. With its poor historical record of electoral governance, the COMELEC was widely seen as lacking the overall institutional and technical capability to successfully carry out its mandate under the law. For instance, the COMELEC never allowed the review of the program's source code by any interested political party or group even while this was mandated by the law itself and with a number of groups demanding such a review.¹¹ In spite of several technical problems attending the automation process including the malfunctioning of compact memory flash cards in a field test case made a week before election day, automated voting took place as scheduled on May 10, 2010. With the speedy counting and tabulation in which votes tallied for national positions reached about 90 percent of the clustered precinct totals in less than 48 hours, the COMELEC declared the automated elections a success. There was general public acceptance of the election results because these matched to a great degree the pre-election survey readings and exit polls at the national level, particularly for the presidential contest.¹²

However, an assessment of the automated election system by civil society groups that closely monitored the entire process ranged from qualified endorsement to highly critical evaluations. In its terminal report on the May 2010 elections, NAMFREL noted that the “automated election system employed by the Commission on Elections and provided by Smartmatic is in serious need of review and remedial measures before it is to be used for future elections.” (NAMFREL 2010: 1) Among the specific problems in the process, NAMFREL identified the following:

The mismatching of time and date stamps, the lack of digital signatures, the lack of a complete inventory of PCOS (Precinct Count Optical Scan) machines (including spares) and CF (Compact Flash) cards (including all replacements), lack of disclosure of source codes and hash codes, the incompleteness of the Random Manual Audit, the incompleteness of electoral counts on servers of PPCRV, KBP, COMELEC, and the political parties form just a partial list of deficiencies of the overall system. Collectively, these deficiencies led to the lack of traceability and auditability of the process from the time a ballot is inserted into a PCOS machine until it is ultimately counted and canvassed. Had results not matched public expectation, these elections may have been questioned and chaos may have resulted. (NAMFREL 2010: 1)¹³

With its core of IT consultants and networking with like-minded groups formed in the Automated Election System (AES) Watch, the research and advocacy NGO, the Center for Peoples' Empowerment Governance (CenPEG)

conducted a systematic evaluation of the entire automation process and came out with the following conclusions:

The high incidence of technical hitches, blunders, voting procedural errors, and other operational failures throughout the country during the May 10, 2010 automated elections can be attributed to the defective automated election system adopted by the COMELEC. Among others, the AES was defective because it was not properly tested, its software programs were proven to contain many bugs and other deficiencies, and the infrastructures for a successful automated election (from transmission to road networks and power systems) were not ready. Moreover, it was aggravated by the lack of safeguards, security and reliability measures, as well as timely and effective continuity/contingency measures.

Among CenPEG's findings were: mismatched time and date stamps on all PCOS machines; transmission failures; erroneous COCs (certificates of canvass) in at least 57 provinces and cities; ballots and CF cards delivered manually for canvassing; discovery of the console port in all machines making the PCOS vulnerable to tampering; erroneous entries of total number of voters and votes cast in the national canvassing center and Congress; near anarchy at the clustered precincts; and, not to forget, the pre-election incidence of defective CF cards. (The CenPEG Report on the May 2010 Automated Elections in the Philippines 2010: 289)

Further casting doubts on the integrity of the May 2010 automated elections, the Philippine Computer Society (PCS) observed that the process was mismanaged because the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM did not follow technical requirements, including security features, mandated by the automation law and the terms of reference of the bidding for the automated system. Among the problems cited by PCS president Nelson Celis and director Edmundo Casino were: delays in the preparations of a process that normally takes about 18 months compared with less than a year for the COMELEC; lack of certification attesting to the 99.995 percent accuracy of the system [an American firm, SysTest Lab, Inc., provided a certification but called for compliance with many "compensating controls" not met by COMELEC]; removal of security safeguards such as digital signatures and UV security mark sensors; and no independent review of the hash/source code. (Ubac 2010: 1-A12)

With its long history of institutionalized violence, systematic fraud and manipulation, and clientelist-patronage ties between national and local politicians and bureaucrats, electoral processes in the Philippines can hardly be considered as free and fair, a necessary procedural requirement of functioning democratic regimes. As can be seen more specifically in electoral contests since

1986---signifying the formal end of authoritarian rule in the country---elections have also failed to overcome significantly its old afflictions. In short, the overall integrity and legitimacy of electoral processes, including their latest incarnation in automation schemes, cannot be isolated from the broader processes of state-building and democratization in the country. When a situation as basic as the Hobbesian problem is not decisively resolved in many parts of the country, the proliferation of private armed groups deploying violence with impunity during elections becomes unsurprising. When significant segments of the population remain poor, uneducated, and disempowered, a culture of vote-buying is bound to persist. When national institutions of governance such as the COMELEC continue to be embedded in debilitating networks of patronage that mock the rule of law, elections become transformed into grand schemes of subverting the peoples' choices. Elections are necessary features of modern, democratic systems but the structures, institutions, and practices that make these exercises truly free and fair have to be systematically constructed and consolidated.

Who gets Elected? Political Families and the State

An understanding of the politics and electoral exercises of the country demands a careful analysis of the resilience of powerful families who have consistently monopolized various national and local positions in the country.¹⁴ This is not surprising since the evolution of the political and economic system of the country revolved around a core of notables made up of the educated elite (*ilustrados*), landlords, and oligarchs historically empowered and legitimized by the system of elections institutionalized by the American colonial order. (Rivera 1994; Hutchcroft 2000; Cullinane 2003; Simbulan 2005). What needs to be understood more systematically is why such political clans have proven to be an enduring feature of the country's social structure and political system and the impact of this structure on state-building and democratization. A better understanding of the political and electoral dynamics of the country is gained by studying these powerful clans rather than, for instance, overly focusing on the country's largely unstable and weakly institutionalized party system. Unlike the political parties which are largely loose, unstable coalitions of elite families activated only during elections, powerful clans are enduring structures of economic and political power.

Modernization theory assumes the breakdown of traditional and particularistic anchors of social coherence and loyalties such as the family, village, and tribe, and the growth of "nation-states" and democracy. However, in many developing societies, such exclusivist and particularistic social

groupings have persisted and the predicted outcomes of stable democratic systems remain problematic.¹⁵ Thus, in this context, state formation and democratization become complex and contentious processes of struggle, accommodation, and domination between two analytically separate but mutually linked spheres of activity: society and the state. One approach that captures this process well, says it thus:¹⁶

States are parts of societies. States may help mold, but they are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are embedded. . . . there is no getting around the mutuality of state-society interactions: Societies affect states as much as, or possibly more than, states affect societies. (Migdal 1994: 2)

As further explained by Migdal, this process of struggles and accommodation between the state and social forces may yield at least four ideal-typical outcomes: 1) total transformation by the state where its penetration leads to the "destruction, co-optation, or subjugation of local social forces;" 2) "state incorporation of existing social forces . . . in order to establish a new pattern of domination;" 3) "existing social forces' incorporation of the state . . . as to harm significantly the state's overall chances of achieving integrated domination in society;" and 4) state failure in its attempt at penetration resulting "in little transformative effect on the society --- and limited effects of the society on the state." (Migdal 1994: 24-26)

In its broad outlines, a "state in society" framework for understanding state formation and democratization in the Philippines may be summed up as follows: The state and its central elites engage in a continuous, conflictual process of struggle and accommodation with various social forces to ensure public order and security, preserve territorial integrity, define cultural markers, and decide on the distribution of power and resources. In the Philippine context, such social forces necessarily include powerful political clans and local strong men, social classes such as landlords and capitalists, workers and peasants, the Catholic Church, various civil society organizations, and the armed movements. Among these social elements, this paper focuses on the role of political clans as the major social force in this state-society engagement. The historian McCoy provides an apt summary of the enduring salience of the family and its kinship network for the entire range of activities in the country's political, economic and cultural life: "In the century past, while three empires and five republics have come and gone, the Filipino family has survived. It provides employment and capital, educates and socializes the young, assures medical care, shelters its handicapped and aged, and strives, above all else, to transmit its name, honor, lands, capital, and values to the next generation" (1993: 7). But a state that is anchored on families and clans with narrow and

exclusivist interests and loyalties is bound to create difficult problems for state formation and democratization, particularly in the absence of strong national political institutions. As sub-ethnic groupings, families and clans are “less likely to foster broad ethno-national movements or nation-state identities” (Collins 2004: 234). Moreover, the accountability mechanism that forms a key aspect of the democratization process becomes short-circuited by narrow kinship loyalties rather than legitimized by broad citizens' choices. In the Philippine context, a key political mechanism used to negotiate contentious state-society linkages driven by powerful family and clan interests has been an electoral process fuelled by a pervasive system of patronage linking national and local political elites.

In the same manner that state-building in a “state in society” framework is to be explained by its engagement with social forces, the process of democratization is likewise to be seen in the same way. Thus state formation may or may not be accompanied by democratization or result in a democratic regime. A democracy is a specific type of regime that requires its rulers to be held publicly accountable by its citizens. One can have a strong and capable state that is undemocratic or a democratic regime in a weak state. However, in the process of modernization, societies with weak state institutions face the risk of being overwhelmed by a multitude of popular demands, and lack the political institutional capability to effectively address such claims.¹⁷ As the political scientist Alfred Stepan argues, “... democracy is impossible without a 'usable state' (2007: 422).

Reflecting the “state in society” framework, this study systematically examines the electoral outcomes from 1987 to 2010 covering the positions of Congressional representatives and provincial governorships. Political families that have won these seats may be considered to be the most influential in the country since these positions serve as the nexus between national and local power by facilitating patronage flows and rent-seeking activities. Needless to say, political families that also win the apex of national positions such as the presidency, vice-presidency, and senatorial positions are able to best maximize their positions of power and authority.

In this study, a political family is deemed to exist if at least two members of the same family (typically up to the third degree of consanguinity) have won a congressional and/or gubernatorial seat between 1987 and 2010. An individual who has won at least three times as representative and/or governor during the same period and who has a family member who had served as president, vice-president, senator, representative or governor during the postwar election years is also deemed to belong to a political family. These definitions actually

underestimate the actual reach of a family's power and influence since these do not include family members elected to lower positions in local governments such as those of city and municipal mayors and members of provincial, city, and municipal boards. However, by concentrating on congressional and gubernatorial positions, the study is able to identify the most powerful and influential political families.¹⁸ This research also uses data drawn from the human development index studies published in the *Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009* to probe into possible relationships between electoral outcomes and three indicators of human development: income, health, and education.

Not surprisingly, the elections between 1987 and 2010 provide a dramatic proof of the continuing dominance and resilience of "political families" in the country. Of the 77 provinces included in this study, 72 provinces or 94 percent have political families as defined in this study. (see Appendix 1 for the provincial and regional distribution). The average number of political families per province is 2.31 and the median is two. For the 13 landlocked provinces, the average number of political families is 1.69 with a median of 1.¹⁹ For the 17 "island provinces", the average is 1.65 families and also a median of 1.²⁰ Thus for both landlocked and island provinces, the number of political families tend to be smaller. Considering the more strict definition of a "political family" adopted in this chapter, these results still show a large number of such dominant political players. This study has also identified a total of 178 dominant political families of which 100 or 56 percent are old elites and 78 or 44 percent are new ones. The old political families trace their power base to the electoral politics of the postwar era, and sometimes to as far back as the colonial era. The new ones have emerged and prospered after the restoration of elections in 1987.

In terms of regional distribution, the biggest number of political families are in Regions III, IV-A, and XI (the three Davao provinces) with an average of at least three dominant political families per province. Except for Nueva Ecija, Quezon, and Davao Oriental, all the other 11 provinces in these three regions belong to the upper half of the best performing provinces using human development indicators in 2006.²¹ In fact, seven of these provinces (Rizal, Cavite, Bataan, Pampanga, Bulacan, Batangas, and Tarlac) ranked within the top 20 provinces on human development indicators. Many of the oldest and most resilient political families in the country (such as the Josons of Nueva Ecija, the Cojuangcos and Aquinos of Tarlac, the Nepomucenos and Lazatins of Pampanga, the Gordons and Magsaysays of Zambales, Laurels and Rectos of Batangas, San Luis and Chipecos of Laguna, Alcalas and Envergas of Quezon, and the Rodriguez family of Rizal) come from these regions. The data suggest that the richer and more populous provinces with at least two congressional

districts have been more conducive to the emergence and consolidation of dominant political families. (see Table 5)

In contrast, the Cordillera provinces of Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Mt. Province have the smallest number of political families with a regional average of 0.83. Abra has two dominant political families but Apayao, Benguet and Mt. Province have only one each while Ifugao and Kalinga have no dominant political players. With the exception of Benguet which had the highest HDI rank in 2006 and Abra ranked at 24, the other provinces had low HDI outcomes with Apayao and Kalinga ranked at 64 and 65 respectively out of 77 provinces. Moreover, except Benguet, the other five provinces are also among the least densely populated in the country with an average population density of 54 persons per square kilometer (NSCB 2010). Finally, all the provinces except Benguet have only single congressional districts which means that there is less leeway for competing political families to establish and consolidate their own electoral turfs. These data suggest that poorer and less populated provinces in single congressional districts have more difficulty generating and sustaining bigger numbers of political families. (see Table 6)

Table 5: Regions with the Biggest Number of Political Families.

Region	Number of Political Families	Mean per Region	Human Development Index Rank (2006)	Major Political Families
Region III	24	3.43		
Aurora	2		37	Angara, Ong
Bataan	2		4	Roman, Garcia
Bulacan	3		11	Silverio, Sy-Alvarado, dela Cruz/Mendoza
Nueva Ecija	4		44	Joson, Lorenzo-Villareal, Violago, Umali
Pampanga	6		6	Bondoc, Lapid, Arroyo, Nepomuceno, Lingad, Lazatin
Tarlac	5		16	Aquino, Cojuangco, Yap, Teodoro, Lapus
Zambales	2		22	Gordon, Magsaysay
Region IV-A	18	3.6		
Batangas	4		15	Laurel, Recto, Perez, Ermita
Cavite	3		3	Remulla, Revilla, Abaya
Laguna	3		5	Chipeco, San Luis, Joaquin
Quezon	5		58	Alcala, Enverga, Tañada, Punzalan, Suarez,
Region XI	11	3.67		
Davao del Norte	3		33	Sarmiento, del Rosario, Florendo/Lagdameo
Davao del Sur	4		14	Almendras, Bautista, Llanos, Cagas
Davao Oriental	4		66	Almario, Dayanghirang, Palma-Gil, Lopez

Table 6: Region with Smallest Number of Political Families

Region	Number of Political Families	Regional Mean	Human Development Index Rank (2006)	Major Political Families
CAR (Cordillera Administrative Region)	5	0.83		
Abra	2		24	Valera, Bersamin
Apayao	1		64	Bulut
Benguet	1		1	Cosalan
Ifugao	0		45	
Kalinga	0		65	
Mt. Province	1		48	Dominguez

Out of the 77 provinces examined, only five (Ifugao, Kalinga, Nueva Vizcaya, Catanduanes, and Eastern Samar) had no dominant political families as defined in this study (see Table 7). These provinces with no political families share two things in common: single congressional districts and low HDI rankings, except for Nueva Vizcaya which showed a high HDI. Catanduanes, Kalinga and Eastern Samar are in the bottom 20 of the provincial HDI rankings while Ifugao is in the lower third of the list. Moreover, Kalinga used to be part of the old province of Kalinga-Apayao and started electing its own set of officials only in 1998.

Table 7: Provinces with No Dominant Political Family, 1987-2010

	HDI Rank 2006	No. of Congressional Districts
1.Nueva Vizcaya	9	1
2.Ifugao	45	1
3.Catanduanes	59	1
4.Kalinga	65	1
5.Eastern Samar	70	1

The poorer economic status of these provinces, except for Nueva Vizcaya, suggest that the local elites may have less resources and capabilities to expand their power bases and enable their family to win the peak electoral positions. Interestingly, in all of these provinces there have emerged strong individual politicians who have served at least three terms as governor or representative, laying the foundations for the possible rise of new dominant political families.

On the whole, provinces with better income, health and education indicators (HDI) show a higher number of political families. Thus, the top 20

provinces on HDI performance in 2006 had an average of 2.8 political families while the lowest 20 provinces had 2.0 families per province. (see Table 8)

Table 8: Political Families by Provincial Human Development Index (HDI) Rank: Top 20 and Lowest 20 Provinces

	Top 20 Provinces, HDI 2006	Lowest 20 Provinces, HDI 2006
No. of Political Families (1987-2007)	56	40
Average per Province	2.8	2.0
Provinces without a Political Family	1.0	3.0

Of the fourteen provinces with the highest number of political families, six are in Luzon, four in the Visayas, and four in Mindanao (see Table 9). Seven of these provinces belong to the top 30 percent of HDI performers (Pangasinan, Tarlac, Batangas, Cebu, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, and Davao del Sur), four to those with mid-level HDI rankings (Nueva Ecija, Camarines Sur, Leyte, and Surigao del Norte) and three (Quezon, Surigao del Sur, and Davao Oriental) to the lowest 30 percent on HDI rankings in 2006. The list includes the country's three most populated provinces, Cebu, Negros Occidental and Pangasinan, each with six congressional seats.²²

Majority of the political families listed for the Luzon and Visayas-based provinces come from the older and traditional political names while the Mindanao provinces of Surigao and Davao show a greater mix of old and new families, partly reflecting their "frontier" origins. Not surprisingly, the provinces in the Luzon and Visayas regions in this list have also been the traditional centers of landed and business power, the export crop economy, and favored access to national state resources. Many of the elites in these provinces trace the origins of their power back to the colonial era and the postwar years when their forebears commanded the most influential elective and appointive positions in government.

Since the restoration of elections in 1987, the most dominant of these political families have succeeded in winning all elections for governors and congressional contests. Six provinces have been monopolized by a single family since 1992 (see Table 10). Three of these provinces have high income, health and education indicators while the three others have low HDI scores. Such overpowering dominance by these families is exemplified by the Ortegas of La Union. One of the most dominant political families in the country, the Ortegas have won all gubernatorial contests since 1988 and the congressional elections in the first district of the province from 1969 to the 2010 elections .

Tracing their political lineage all the way to the early American colonial era when the clan patriarch, Partido Federal member Joaquin Ortega was first appointed as La Union's governor in 1901, the family has become a permanent fixture in the political life of the province.²³

Table 9: Provinces with Highest Number of Political Families, 1987-2010

	No. of Political Families	HDI Rank 2006	No. of Congressional Districts	Major Political Families
1.Pangasinan	7	20	6	Agbayani, Estrella, Bengson, Perez, de Venecia, Celeste, Cojuangco
2.Leyte	7	49	5	Apostol, Loreto, Veloso, Locsin, Romualdez, Petilla, Cari
3.Cebu	6	21	6	Osmeña, Durano, Gullas, Garcia, Kintanar, Martinez
4.Negros Occidental	6	26	6	Marañon, Alvarez, Lacson, Yulo, Ferrer, Arroyo
5.Tarlac	5	16	3	Aquino, Cojuangco, Yap, Teodoro, Lapus
6.Quezon	5	58	4	Alcala, Enverga, Punzalan, Suarez, Tañada
7.Iloilo	5	12	5	Garin, Lopez, Syjuco, Defensor, Tupas/Suplico
8.Surigao del Sur	5	60	2	Ty, Murillo, Pimentel, Falcon, Pichay
9.Davao del Sur	4	14	2	Almendras, Bautista, Llanos, Cagas
10.Davao Oriental	4	66	2	Almario, Lopez, Palma-Gil, Dayanghirang
11.Batangas	4	15	4	Laurel, Recto, Perez, Ermita
12.Camarines Sur	4	36	4	Alfelor, Andaya, Fuentebella, Villafuerte
13.Nueva Ecija	4	44	4	Joson, Violago, Lorenzo/Villareal, Umali
14.Surigao del Norte	4	46	2	Ecleo, Navarro, Matugas, Barbers

Table 10: Governorships Ruled by a Single Political Family, 1992-2010.

	HDI Rank, 2006	Political Family
1.Rizal	2	Ynares
2.La Union	10	Ortega/Orros (1988-2010)
3. Lanao del Norte	23	Dimaporo
4. Camarines Sur	36	Villafuerte (1988-92; 95-2010)
5.Leyte	49	Petilla
6.Agusan del Sur	57	Plaza

Among congressional districts, there are 19 families all over the country that have exclusively controlled elections in their respective congressional constituencies since the 1987 congressional elections (see Table 11). Suggesting an alternation rule, Przeworski et al. define a country as undemocratic when the same party wins three consecutive elections (2000).

Table 11: Congressional Districts Ruled by a Single Political Family, 1987-2010.

	Political Family	Province HDI Rank, 2006
1.D4-Pampanga	Bondoc	6
2.D1-Tarlac	Cojuangco-Teodoro	16
3.D3-Tarlac	Aquino-Lapus	16
4.D1-La Union	Ortega	10
5.D2-Ilocos Sur	Singson	19
6.D1-Isabela	Albano	27
7.D1-Albay	Lagman	32
8.D1-Sorsogon	Escudero	51
9. Lone District-Quirino	Cua	18
10.D1-Iloilo	Garin	12
11.D5-Iloilo	Tupas-Suplico	12
12.D5-Cebu	Durano	21
13.D3-Negros Oriental	Teves	63
14.D5-Leyte	Loreto-Cari	49
15.Lone District-Siquijor	Fua	31
16.D2-Davao Oriental	Almario	66
17.D2-Davao del Sur	Bautista	14
18.D3-Bukidnon	Zubiri	28
19.Lone District-Camiguin	Romualdo	34

If political families can be considered as the functional surrogate of political parties in the country, then one has to be alarmed by the same families winning elections for no less than 8 consecutive terms or 24 straight years! For instance, at least six of these permanently controlled congressional districts show relatively low to very low achievements in HDI (Siquijor, Albay, Camiguin, Sorsogon, Negros Oriental, Davao Oriental) and yet the ruling political families have managed to get themselves perpetually elected in these depressed areas. Following the same alternation rule suggested by Przeworski, the undemocratic outcomes for governorships is also indicated by the fact that for the eight elections between 1988-2010, fifty one provinces out of 77 or 66 percent, had a political family winning gubernatorial elections for at least three consecutive terms.

Another indicator of the political power and reach of the political families has been their ability to control the two top positions in the province: the governorship and congressional district(s). In the hierarchy of power and

patronage flows, controlling these two elective positions ensures easier access to national resources while at the same time facilitating control on the ground. When these two positions are not controlled by the same family, intense factional struggles oftentimes ensue. It is not surprising therefore that political families aim to control these two pivotal positions. Of the 77 provinces in this study, 46 or 60 percent had families that were able to win these two positions at various times from 1987-2010 (see Table 12).²⁴

Congressional representatives receive institutionalized funding through the priority development assistance fund (PDAF) which now amounts to P70 million per year for each member of the House of Representatives. This excludes additional allocations that they may be able to access through their congressional committee positions and related congressional initiative allocations. On the other hand, local government officials enjoy institutionalized funding through the internal revenue allotments (IRA) as provided for by the Local Government Code (LGC). While its amount depends on the revenues collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the standardized distribution formula provided by the LGC, the IRA constitutes a significant financial resource for local politicians, especially in the face of weak accountability mechanisms for the expenditure of such resources. For instance in 2008, the highest IRA went to Pangasinan at P1,324,000,000. while Batanes received the lowest at P167,000,100. (NSCB 2008)

Table 12: Political Families with Gubernatorial and Congressional Positions, 1987-2010.

Province	Political Family	Province	Political Family
1.Ilocos Norte	Marcos	24.Cebu	Garcia
2.Ilocos Sur	Singson	25.Negros Occidental	Marañon
3.La Union	Ortega	26.Leyte	Petilla
4.Pangasinan	Agbayani	27.Southern Leyte	Mercado
5.Isabela	Dy	28.Siquijor	Fua
6.Aurora	Angara-Castillo	29.Western Samar	Tan
7.Bataan	Roman, Garcia	30.Northern Samar	Daza, Ong
8.Tarlac	Yap, Cojuangco	31.Misamis Occidental	Ramiro
9.Zambales	Magsaysay	32.Biliran	Espina
10.Nueva Ecija	Joson, Umali	33.Bukidnon	Zubiri
11.Bulacan	Sy-Alvarado	34.Agusan del Norte	Amante
12.Cavite	Remulla, Revilla	35.Surigao del Norte	Ecleo, Barbers, Matugas
13.Laguna	San Luis	36.North Cotabato	Piñol
14.Batangas	Recto	37.Davao del Norte	Del Rosario
15.Quirino	Cua	38.Davao del Sur	Cagas
16.Camarines Norte	Padilla	39.Zamboanga del Sur	Cerilles
17.Quezon	Suarez, Enverga	40.Zamboanga del Norte	Amatong
18.Palawan	Mitra, Socrates	41.Sultan Kudarat	Mangudadatu
19.Masbate	Espinosa, Kho, Lanete	42.Lanao del Sur	Adiong
20.Marinduque	Reyes	43.Lanao del Norte	Dimaporo
21.Iloilo	Defensor, Tupas	44.Maguindanao	Ampatuan/Datumanong, Matalam
22. Antique	Javier	45. Basilan	Akbar
23. Guimaras	Nava	46. Sulu	Loong

The most powerful families are able to capture both gubernatorial and congressional positions in their provinces during the same election year (see Table 13). For instance, in the 2010 elections, 34 out of 77 provinces or 44 percent had the same political family winning the governorship and at least one congressional district. Such concentration of political power becomes most acute in provinces with lone congressional districts.

Table 13: Political Families with Governors and Representatives in 2010 Elections.

Province	Political Family	Province	Political Family
1. Ilocos Norte	Marcos	18. Antique	Javier
2. Ilocos Sur	Singson	19. Negros Occidental	...
3. La Union	Ortega	20. Siquijor	Fua
4. Isabela	Dy	21. Cebu	Garcia
5. Quirino	Cua	22. Biliran	Espina
6. Bataan	Garcia	23. Southern Leyte	Mercado
7. Tarlac	Yap	24. Leyte	Petilla
8. Aurora	Angara-Castillo	25. Northern Samar	Daza
9. Bulacan	Sy-Alvarado	26. Zamboanga del Sur	Cerilles
10. Nueva Ecija	Umali	27. Camiguin	Romualdo
11. Cavite	Remulla	28. Lanao del Norte	Dimaporo
12. Quezon	Suarez	29. Davao del Sur	Cagas
13. Oriental Mindoro	Umali	30. Davao del Norte	Del Rosario
14. Camarines Sur	Villafuerte	31. Sultan Kudarat	Mangudadatu
15. Masbate	Seachon-Lanete	32. Agusan del Norte	Amante
16. Guimaras	Nava	33. Agusan del Sur	Plaza
17. Iloilo	Defensor	34. Surigao del Norte	Matugas

Thus in the same election year, eight provinces had the same political family controlling both the gubernatorial and lone congressional district (Quirino, Aurora, Guimaras, Siquijor, Biliran, Camiguin, Antique, and Sultan Kudarat). In fact, the congressional districts of Quirino, Siquijor, and Camiguin have always been controlled by the same families (Cua, Fua, and Romualdo, respectively) from 1987-2010. Further dramatizing this monopolization of power, the Singsons of Ilocos Sur and the Dimaporos of Lanao del Norte captured both the governorship and the two congressional positions in their respective provinces. Even in the multi-congressional district of Cebu (six districts), the Garcia family won two districts in addition to the governorship.

Turnover Rates for Governors and Representatives

Turnover rates for political families provide us a firm data base for determining how often are they replaced or how long they are able to hold on to their elective positions. While this data base does not provide the reasons why politicians get re-elected or replaced so many number of times, it serves as another indicator of the degree of dominance and resilience of political families. Consistent with the findings of the study about the continuing dominance of

political families in most of the provinces, the turnover rates for political family members running for governors and representatives on the average are equally low: 2.16 for governors and 1.84 for representatives (See Appendix B).²⁵ With eight electoral cycles for the period being studied, the maximum turnover rate is seven if incumbent officials were replaced every election year.

The data show that for eight election contests for governors between 1988 and 2010, one province (La Union) did not experience any turnover since the governorship was controlled by just one family (Ortega/Orros). There were 20 provinces with single turnovers, meaning that the governorship was dominated by only two families (see Appendix B). The province of Occidental Mindoro registered the highest turnover rate at five, while eight provinces (Benguet, Ifugao, Romblon, Catanduanes, Bohol, Eastern Samar, Misamis Occidental and Misamis Oriental) had four turnovers.

Region 1 and Region 13 (CARAGA) show the lowest turnover rates for governors at 1.25 and 1.5 respectively (see Table 14). The La Union governorship has been controlled by one family, the Ortegas, for the entire period under study. Predictably, Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur have also been controlled by dominant families: the Marcoses in the former and the Singsons in the latter. While Pangasinan has the country's biggest number of political families at seven, it could only manage three turnovers for its governorship with the Agbayani family having served the longest at four terms.

In Region 13, one finds some of the country's most dominant political families including the Plazas of Agusan del Sur who have controlled the governorship of the province from 1992 to the 2010 elections. In the other three provinces of the region, there have been only single turnovers for governorships from one family to the other for the same 21 year period. Thus, in Agusan del Norte, the Amante family has been dominant for the last 18 years; in Surigao del Sur, the Murillo and Pimentel families have shared control over the governorship; and in Surigao del Norte, the Matugas and Barbers family have dominated.

The regions with the highest turnover rates for governors include Region 4-B (Mimaropa) at 3.0 and the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) at 2.67. (see Table 14) Region 4-B is made up of five island provinces (Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Palawan, and Romblon) with relatively few established political families with the provincial mean at 1.4. All the five island provinces had poor HDI records in 2006 with Romblon ranked among the lowest 10. The CAR has the smallest number of political families with a regional mean of 0.83 and two of its provinces (Apayao and Kalinga) had no established political family. With the exception of Benguet, all the CAR provinces also had poor indices for income, health and education in 2006.

Table 14: Average Turnover Rates for Governors and Representatives by Region, 1987-2010.

	Turnover Rate for Governors, 1988-2010	Turnover Rate for Representatives, 1987-2010
CAR	2.67	2.17
Region 1	1.25	1.38
Region 2	2.00	1.60
Region 3	1.86	1.30
Region 4-A	2.60	2.00
Region 4-B	3.00	2.20
Region 5	2.33	2.39
Region 6	2.00	1.78
Region 7	2.50	1.21
Region 8	2.17	1.85
Region 9	2.00	1.59
Region 10	2.60	1.80
Region 11	2.00	1.50
Region 12	2.25	1.88
Region 13	1.50	2.13
ARMM	1.80	2.70
National Average	2.16	1.84

Shifting to the congressional representatives, the regions showing the lowest turnover rates include Regions 7 and 3 (see Table 14). The long dominance of powerful families in their respective districts in Cebu and Negros Oriental and the complete control of the Fua family of Siquijor's lone district largely account for the low turnover rates in the region. Thus, the Negros congressional districts show an average turnover rate of only 1 while Cebu is at 1.5. However, Bohol shows a higher turnover rate of 2.33. On the other hand, Region 3 hosts some of the country's longest established political families such as those in Tarlac, Pampanga, Zambales, and relatively newer but stable families in Aurora, Bulacan, and Bataan. While it has the country's biggest concentration of political families, inter-elite competition is moderated at the congressional districts because each family has developed its own turf and power base.

The regions which show the highest turnover rates for congressional districts are the ARMM and Region 5 (see Table 14). Sharing some common structural features, the provinces in both regions are some of the poorest in the whole country. Using HDI rankings, the ARMM provinces show the worst outcomes in the country while four of the six provinces in Region 5 (Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon) cluster in the lowest one third of

of the same list. The ARMM provinces show extreme variations in turnover rates with Basilan having 5.0, Sulu with 3.5, Lanao del Sur at 2.5, Maguindanao at 1.5 while Tawi-Tawi only had one. Moreover, the long history of violence and the proliferation of loose arms in the ARMM may have contributed to a much more unstable situation for elite consolidation.

On the possible relationship of turnover rates with HDI outcomes, the study suggests that turnover rates for governors in the richer provinces show virtually no difference with those of the poorer provinces as measured by HDI rankings in 2006 (see Table 15). This implies that established political families in the poorer provinces have as much capabilities of retaining power as their counterparts in the richer provinces. Moreover, the greater political competition that is assumed to exist with more political players in the richer provinces does not seem to have significantly dented the resilience of these established families. When some of these established families do suffer electoral defeats they get replaced by families that soon consolidate into new centers of political dominance.

Table 15: Average Turnover Rates for Governors : Top 20 and Lowest 20 Provinces by HDI Rank

	Top 20 Provinces, HDI 2006	Average No. of Political Families per province	Lowest 20 provinces, HDI 2006	Average No. of Political Families per province
Governors' Average Turnover Rate (1988-2007)	1.6	2.8	1.65	2.0

Probing into the impact of good governance on electoral outcomes, a study of the 2004 elections by a team of researchers from the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) also showed conflicting results (Virola et al. 2004). Using the Good Governance Index (GGI) to classify the best and worst provinces, Virola et al. found out that 8 out of the 10 incumbent governors from the 10 best provinces in 2004 (Laguna, Batanes, Rizal, Benguet, Cavite, Bulacan, Bataan, South Cotabato, Batangas and Siquijor) who ran for reelection as governor or congressperson won, while two lost.²⁶ But a surprisingly similar result was obtained in the 10 worst provinces (Masbate, Sulu, Maguindanao, Romblon, Northern Samar, Surigao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Sultan Kudarat, Camarines Norte and Sorsogon) when 8 out of the 10 incumbent governors who ran for reelection won, while two lost (one ran for Congress).

Further probing into the impact on electoral outcomes of socio-economic indicators based on the HDI rankings of provinces in 2006, this study also shows that incumbent reelectionist governors win not only in high HDI

provinces but also in the worst provinces. For instance, in the 2007 gubernatorial elections, eight out of the ten incumbent governors in the ten top-ranked provinces by HDI won their reelection bids (one ran for Congress). These top ten provinces were Benguet, Rizal, Cavite, Bataan, Laguna, Pampanga, Ilocos Norte, Batanes, Nueva Vizcaya, and La Union. But as in the 2004 study by Virola et al., eight out of the 10 incumbent governors also won reelection in the worst 10 provinces by HDI ranking (Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Masbate, Sarangani, Eastern Samar, Zamboanga del Norte and Romblon).

The study of electoral outcomes between 1987 and 2010 show little evidence that elections have served as accountability mechanisms either from a “mandate” or “sanctions” point of view. A mandate system of accountability assumes that citizens can use elections to select “good policies or policy-bearing politicians”. On the other hand, a “sanctions” view means that voters use elections “to hold governments responsible for the results of their past actions”. However, the low turnover rates for representatives and governors across all provinces, regardless of socio-economic conditions, suggest that neither of these accountability mechanisms seems to work. Moreover, the ability of incumbent political families to win even in the provinces with the worst governance and socio-economic outcomes stress the fact that there are deep-seated structural problems (such as poverty and lack of education) and backward political-institutional practices (such as patronage networks, unregulated use of violence and coercion, and electoral manipulation) that systematically undermine the potential of elections to serve as accountability mechanisms.

Elections, Political Parties and Democratic Accountability

Electoral practices in normally functioning democratic systems are usually complemented by a party system that enhance the accountability process and help in more effective governance. As Hagopian points out, “political parties are the most important agents of political representation in modern democracies” (2007: 582). The comparative literature on elections and parties, for instance in Latin America, show that institutionalized party systems facilitate effective governance by providing structure to democratic politics in the electoral arena and the legislature (Mainwaring and Scully 2008: 119).²⁷ Drawing on their studies of various Latin American countries, the same authors argue that “without a reasonably institutionalized party system, the future of democracy is bleak.” (1995: 473-4).

As shown earlier, our electoral politics continue to be dominated by powerful families typically pursuing narrow and fragmented interests primarily dictated by clan and local district considerations. Under these conditions, there has not emerged any effective national party system that can function to aggregate these extremely diverse, oftentimes conflicting local interests. In the absence of such a party system that can offer coherent, programmatic policy packages around which like-minded politicians and citizens can organize, elections and political parties can hardly be expected to serve as mechanisms of accountability. Not surprisingly therefore, what purport to be political parties have functioned mainly as convenient, temporary alliances by elites to win elections but lacking any internal dynamic for long-term institutionalization. Grossholtz's observation in 1964 that the country's parties are "but coalitions of factions put together largely for electoral purposes and characterized by constantly shifting loyalties to men, not issues" has not lost its relevance for our time (1964: 136).

But why have national programmatic parties capable of mediating and aggregating the diverse and conflicting interests of clans and citizens failed to develop? The first explanation lies in the social and historical roots of party formation in the country. In countries that developed strong and stable parties, party formation emerged from deeply embedded societal cleavages (class, religious, rural vs. urban, worker vs. capitalist) and parties institutionalize themselves precisely to "represent" and advance such interests (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). An alternative reading argues that parties, in fact, deliberately shape and provide identities to such cleavages and it is this systematic party intervention that makes such cleavages politically salient (Sartori 1969). In both readings of the origins of stable party formation, however, there exists an organic linkage between the party and specific social constituencies and both are locked into a mutually reinforcing system of loyalties and obligations leading to institutionalization. In the more stable democratic systems, in fact, the contending parties have succeeded in channeling deep cleavages "into open and organized class conflict" through the electoral system (Heller 2000).

The Philippines, of course, suffers from deep cleavages especially along class and identity issues as witness the continuing armed and contentious struggles waged to articulate such concerns. However, the first political parties formed under American colonial rule derived their legitimacy precisely by co-opting the local elites away from the revolutionary struggle that in various ways sought to address these cleavages. Thus, the Partido Federal and later the Nacionalista party ended up essentially as parties of the local municipal and provincial elite families sustained by their American patrons and with no accountability to well defined social constituencies.²⁸

Reflecting the deep seated class cleavages of the colonial order, new political parties firmly built on these concerns emerged later. Thus, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the Sakdal Party were deliberately founded to represent the interests of specific constituencies made up primarily of the peasantry and the workers. In fact, these parties participated in various election contests and the peasant-worker base of the Socialist and Communist Party provided the main electoral constituency of the Democratic Alliance that participated in the 1946 national elections.²⁹ However, the vicissitudes of the Second World War and the Cold War, the perception of elite domination of the electoral contests, and the systematic persecution and harassment of the leaders and supporters of these parties pushed them to abandon the parliamentary struggle.

The main lesson here is that the origins and social bases of a political party matter in determining its degree of institutionalization and responsiveness to a programmatic platform. Parties consciously built to represent the interests of specific social constituencies, particularly to address deep-seated cleavages and conflict are more likely to be institutionalized and stable because of the cycle of representation and accountability built into the relationship between the leaders and their followers. In fact, the strongest impetus for reforming the country's party system will most likely come from the pressures exerted by well-disciplined mass-based parties, a process that is now unfolding in our electoral system, partly through the Party List system, notwithstanding its many institutional infirmities.³⁰ Toward this end, the challenge is to construct a political and electoral system that allows for "open and organized conflict" such that even parties articulating alternative ideologies are fully encouraged to participate in elections and parliamentary struggles.

The second factor that determines the nature of the party system lies in the set of institutions and electoral rules that enable or constrain the way the parties operate. What has been the impact of some of the institutions and rules under our presidential system, especially those that have been adopted since 1987? By its nature, a presidential system, in contrast with a parliamentary system, is a "divided government" with the presidency and Congress enjoying "dual legitimacies" through elections. As pointed out by the political comparativist Juan Linz, presidentialism may also "generate its own distinctive anti-party sentiment" since parties in this system are less likely to articulate government programs and broad public policies ---functions which are more likely to be performed by presidents" (2002: 292). Moreover, as further stressed by Linz, presidential elections also "tend to weaken the standing of parties since the president is not elected as a leader of a party and might even be outsiders with

no links to parties" (2002: 292). In the Philippine presidential system, the nationwide electoral mandate enjoyed by the Senate further complicates the problems of representation and governmental efficiency.

In presidential systems, there is an inherent tension between national and particularistic representation, with the executive generally addressing broader national policy matters and the legislature usually tied down to parochial district interests (Shugart and Carey 1992). One institutional response to this tension has been the practice of endowing the executive with significant legislative and related powers vis-à-vis the legislature. In the absence of a strong and stable party system, this is a convenient mechanism to address the competing demands of governmental efficiency and representation but is also fraught with a lot of problems. The key problem lies in how to check the overly strong powers of the presidency once the executive is allowed to act as the surrogate legislator to solve the problems of collective action embedded in the naturally particularistic legislature.

It is in this context that the role of a well-institutionalized and stable party system can best be appreciated as an important mediating and aggregating mechanism for the competing demands of district interests and national policy concerns. Without this important institutional mechanism of a party mediating between the president and the legislature and local officials and also attending to intra-party affairs, presidential powers become heightened and prone to abuse.

One major rule that has had a direct bearing on the party system since 1987 concerns the one-term limit imposed on the presidency. A one-term rule can weaken the president's incentive to strengthen parties because the sanctioning or disciplining effect of prospective elections is lost. In short, if the incumbent president is not qualified for reelection, the same official faces no strong pressure to strengthen the party to win prospective elections.³¹ Moreover, a one-term rule for the presidency lowers the entry barrier for prospective candidates for the next round of elections resulting in the proliferation of candidates and their ephemeral parties (Kasuya 2009). This has been validated by the big number of presidential candidates in every presidential election since 1992: 7 candidates in 1992; 10 in 1998; 5 in 2004; and 9 in 2010; or an average of 8 candidates during the last four presidential elections. Each presidential candidate not affiliated with any of the established parties normally creates a new party just for the election contest and which disappears with the defeat of the candidate.

However, there is a counter-argument in support of term limits for the presidency. First, the incumbent normally cannot use the powers of office to commit fraud on his behalf (although it can be done to favor his party). Second, with reelection not an option, the incumbent's fear of being prosecuted for illegal activities once out of office may keep the executive more honest (Fearon 1999:62). It appears that the Philippine experience does not strongly support these arguments. The present study has shown that political families have easily bypassed the term limits imposed on incumbents by relying on family members to continue contesting elections.

The separate election of the president and the vice-president, instead of being chosen as a team representing the same party, also weakens the process of party building. Moreover, the present system of electing senators as individuals rather than as a team representing political parties with coherent policies and programs encourages intra-party competition among the party members particularly for the hotly contested tail-end positions.

Do synchronized elections, as mandated by R.A. 7166 and implemented since 1992, lead to more efficient governments and stable parties? There are at least two contrasting views on this matter. One view argues that such elections “weaken party links between national and local candidates” as each set of leaders focus on fighting their own electoral battles at the expense of greater party unity and coherence (Velasco 2006: 100). A related view also agrees that synchronized elections are detrimental to party formation since “it puts a lot of premium on name recognition and recall rather than issue positions” (Manacsa and Tan 2005: 757). Sartori explains that synchronized and staggered elections have their own strength and weakness. He points out that staggered elections “keep the polity in tune with shifts in popular opinion and enhance the responsiveness of politicians” but it also makes the construction of legislative majorities more difficult to satisfy (1997: 178-9). He adds that synchronized or simultaneous elections allow for the easier construction of majority blocs and concludes that if the priority is for “performing and responsible governments”, then synchronized elections should be favored (1997: 179). However, in the Philippine context with its weak legislature vis-à-vis the presidency and weak party system, the construction of “legislative majorities” is derived not so much from elections but from the post-electoral realignments that normally follow the election of a new president. Such presidential-driven party realignments dictated by legislators' desire to have easy access to the enormous resources and perks of the presidency naturally further weaken the party system.

Another major electoral institutional innovation of the 1987 constitution concerns the Party List (PL) system. This paper will concern itself with major

issues that have not been well addressed in existing studies about the PL system.³² The first major issue about the PL system is how strictly the government will implement the Supreme Court ruling (*Bayan Muna vs. Comelec*) that only citizens belonging to “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, organizations and parties shall be allowed in the PL election. In practice, however, the Comelec has exercised a lot of leeway in implementing the law and has allowed the participation of several parties and individuals whose credentials will not pass a strict rendering of the court's ruling. Alarmed by this development, former Supreme Court Chief Justice, Reynato Puno, asserted in his concurring and dissenting opinion in *Banat vs Comelec, BM et al vs Comelec*, that allowing major political parties to participate in the party list process “will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty, and betray the democratic spirit of the constitution” (cited in Tuazon 2011: 25).

The actual implementation of the PL system has resulted in an extreme fragmentation of the political parties running under this system. This has exacerbated the problems of a divided government and the aggregation of interests in a presidential system with weak parties to begin with. The PL law elects candidates under a system of proportional representation but imposes at the same time a 3-seat cap and a 2 percent minimum vote threshold for winning candidates. To fill up the constitutionally mandated 20 percent seats in the House of Representatives for PL parties, the Supreme Court decision on April 21, 2009 (*Banat vs. Comelec, BM et al vs Comelec*) declared as unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party list seats but retained the three-seat cap for each winning party. The Supreme Court justifies the retention of the three-seat cap as a “valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party list elections” but this fear has no empirical basis. For instance, in the last four elections, no party has received more than 11 percent of the total votes cast for the party list as shown in the following results by first ranked parties: 2001, *Bayan Muna*, 11%; 2004, *Bayan Muna*, 9%; 2007, *BUHAY*, 7%; and 2010, *AKO Bicol Political Party*, 4%. Moreover, the aggregate votes cast for the single largest bloc of party list organizations (*Makabayan*) comprising *Bayan Muna*, *Anak Pawis*, *Gabriela*, *Kabataan*, and *Act Teachers* also do not exceed 10 percent of the total votes cast for the PL system. But at the same time, parties that do well in the party list system are always penalized by the three-seat cap, a clear violation of the principle of proportional representation which is recognized as one of the “four inviolable parameters of the Philippine party list system”. What are the effects of these rules on interest representation and party formation?

From the point of view of representation, it appears that a wider set of interests are indeed represented in the PL system but this practice also magnifies the problem of too many particularistic and narrow interests being represented with no established mechanism for aggregating such interests. An examination of the parties running under the PL system reveals a bewildering array of organizations representing diverse interests including mainly ethnic and religious concerns and all kinds of fly-by-night dummy organizations opportunistically set up by powerful vested interests to win congressional seats. In fact, these narrow interest groups undermine the legitimacy of the truly programmatic parties running under this list which could gain more seats and exert a stronger impact on the legislative process in a truly proportional system of voting without seat caps.

Thus, the current PL system has actually aggravated the problem of multipartism in presidential systems which could accentuate "immobilism" in the relationship between the executive and legislature or result in "purely opportunistic negotiated deals, wheeling and dealing, legislative log-rolling, etc." (Sartori 1997). In short, the PL system as it has actually been implemented has resulted in a false sense of democratic representation which may in fact further strengthen presidential powers at the expense of the legislature. If a PL system with proportional representation (PR) is to be combined with presidentialism, already a problem by itself, it would be better to abide by the strict logic of the PR system of election by doing away with the seat caps but retaining a reasonable minimum winning threshold to control the excessive party fragmentation at work in the present system. Side by side with these reforms, it is also worthwhile looking into the possibility of increasing the seats allocated for the party list system to help balance the entrenched oligarchic power of the dominant political families in Congress. These rules would be an incentive for the programmatic parties representing broader interests as they can win more seats proportional to their actual strength while discouraging those identified with the narrowest interests and constituencies.

Conclusion

With its long and continuing history of electoral violence and coercion, fraud and manipulation, and poor electoral governance, elections in the Philippines can hardly qualify as "free, fair, and competitive" processes, widely seen as necessary for any successful democratization. Through a confluence of deep socio-economic structural problems and political-institutional infirmities, the country has also entrenched through its electoral exercises, an oligarchy of powerful political families, remarkable for their

resiliency and adaptability since the colonial era. Moreover, with their local political dominance and natural linkages with national elites, these families have been largely insulated from accountability mechanisms, already ineffective to begin with, in the context of a weak state tradition. Not surprisingly, electoral exercises in the country have largely failed as disciplining or accountability mechanisms. Thus, given their dismal record as instruments of vertical accountability, elections and parties in the country have failed to advance the process of democratization.

Shaped by the needs and adaptations of the American colonial order, political parties in the country originated as vehicles to co-opt local elites from the anti-colonial revolutionary movement and later developed as convenient alliances of *ilustrado* politicians and municipal and provincial elites to legitimize their power and consolidate access to national patrons and resources. Divorced from any effective linkages and relationships of accountability with distinct social constituencies, the traditional parties remain as convenient electoral alliances, weakly institutionalized, and devoid of programmatic governance agenda. While not forsaking the need for institutional reforms to strengthen the party system as in the Party List, the greater push for strengthening the party system lies in giving full play to the development of alternative parties articulating distinct interests of social constituencies and challenging the traditional parties inside and outside the legal institutional arenas in open and protected forms of organized conflict.

Naturally contentious and oftentimes protracted, the democratization process must establish predictable procedures and mechanisms for political engagement while ensuring a core set of human development outcomes for enhancing both individual and social welfare. Working for credible elections and parties is a necessary step in this direction but this daunting challenge remains unresolved and requires the collective participation and vigilance of the country's leaders and people.

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Notes

- 1 For a full discussion of this book's conceptualization and measurement of democracy, see the chapter by Miranda above.
- 2 Schmitter makes the important clarification that even in democratic systems, public officials need not always be elected since alternative ways of choosing rulers or representing interests are possible (such as through lottery and rotation) as long as such practices have public consent (2004: 47).
- 3 In the literature on democratic governance, elections constitute a form of "vertical accountability" between citizens, representatives, and rulers. In contrast "horizontal accountability" refers to interactions such as "checks and balances" among the different branches of the regime and state acting according to constitutional and legal rules (Schmitter 2004: 52-3). For horizontal accountability, see Guillermo O'Donnell (1998).

- 4 However, while Laurel did not formally concede defeat he pacified his supporters for a truly patriotic reason and pointed out the greater danger of civil war in the country. This was pointed out by Felipe B. Miranda in a written commentary to the author.
- 5 As the constitutional body for overseeing electoral governance in the country and for its dismal track record in performing its mandate, the COMELEC deserves a separate study. For recent studies on the COMELEC, see Calimbahin 2010 and 2011.
- 6 In 2011, in the aftermath of the trial of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, former ARMM Governor Zaldy Ampatuan and Atty. Lintang Bedol, Maguindanao COMELEC election supervisor in 2007, both admitted to the widespread vote manipulation in the 2004 and 2007 elections in their province. Also in 2011, PNP Senior Superintendent, Rafael Santiago publicly admitted to having led a Special Forces Action team in early 2005 allegedly on orders of then PNP chief, Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr., to replace original election returns with manufactured ones at the Batasan Pambansa complex (House of Representatives building complex). This operation was in anticipation of the recounting of ballots in the face of an election protest filed against Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by the widow of the late Fernando Poe, Jr., who ran for the presidency in 2004. For a study of the systematic electoral fraud perpetrated in 2004, see Bobby M. Tuazon, ed., *Fraud: Gloria M. Arroyo and the May 2004 Elections* (Quezon City: CenPEG Publications 2006). For the role of COMELEC and NAMFREL in the 1953, 1986 and 2004 elections, see Cleo Calimbahin (2010).
- 7 Charged of conducting an investigation whitewash by independent observers, election monitoring bodies, and the political opposition, the government military panel was headed by Vice-Admiral Mateo Mayuga, inspector general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
- 8 Lt. Gen. Rodolfo C. Garcia served as the commander of Task Force Hope which was formed to help the Commission on Elections in conducting honest, orderly, and peaceful elections in 2004. Brig. Gen. Raymundo Ferrer was the commanding general of the Army's 103rd infantry brigade based in Basilan province. Lt. Col. Victoriano Pimentel was assigned in Sulu during the 2004 elections. (Cabacungan, Jr. and Esguerra 2011: 1)
- 9 The Ampatuan political clan of Maguindanao province was held responsible for the massacre and its leaders (former Gov. Andal Ampatuan Sr., and his two sons, former ARMM governor, Zaldy Ampatuan, and former Mayor Andal Ampatuan Jr.) had been detained and undergoing trial.
- 10 For a comparative study of the causes and consequences of vote buying, see Schaffer 2007.
- 11 The source code is the human readable set of instructions that define what the computer will do. For a comprehensive assessment of the May 2010 automation project by COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM, see "The CenPEG Report on the May 2010 Automated Elections in the Philippines," by the Center for Peoples' Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) 2010.

- 12 The decision to concede defeat made by former Senate President Manuel B. Villar, Jr., a day after the automated counting showed him losing to Senator Benigno Simeon “Noynoy” C. Aquino III also helped defuse the electoral tension and firmed up the acceptability of the results.
- 13 There were many electoral protests mounted by losing candidates especially at the House of Representatives and local government level. The most notable election protest was filed by losing vice-presidential candidate, senator Manuel Roxas II against winning candidate, Makati city mayor, Jejomar Binay.
- 14 For a discussion of the dynamics of state and family relations, see Alfred W. McCoy, ed., *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*. University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.
- 15 A classic discussion of this problem in the political science literature is by Samuel P. Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- 16 The “state in society” approach as exemplified in the book edited by Migdal, Kohli and Shue (1994), as well as earlier “state-society” approaches run the risk of neglecting international forces and actors that heavily impinge on the process. As conceded by co-authors Kohli and Shue themselves, the role of international factors need to be integrated in the analysis to provide a comprehensive understanding of the process. Like many developing states, the Philippine experience has been necessarily shaped to a significant extent by international factors whether in its colonial or post-colonial manifestations. Whether international forces have strengthened or weakened state-building and democratization processes need to be better understood in specific historical contexts. For a systematic use of the “state in society” framework that also incorporates global forces for understanding Philippine history, see Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*. Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2005.
- 17 See Huntington (1968).
- 18 However, political families elected in key city centers all over the country such as those of Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Cebu, and Davao, that may even be more powerful and influential than some governors and representatives are also not included in the current study.
- 19 The 13 landlocked provinces include Benguet, Abra, Apayao, Ifugao, Kalinga, Mt. Province (all in the Cordillera Administrative Region), Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Bukidnon, North Cotabato, and Agusan del Sur.
- 20 The “island provinces” include: Batanes, Oriental and Occidental Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, Palawan, Catanduanes, Masbate, Guimaras, Cebu, Bohol, Siquijor, Biliran, and Camiguin, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.

- 21 Unless otherwise stated, all human development indicators used in this study are drawn from the *Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009* published by the Human Development Network (HDN) in cooperation with the UNDP and the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), 2009.
- 22 In 2007, Cebu, Negros Occidental, and Pangasinan were ranked numbers one, two, and fifth, in terms of population (NSCB 2010).
- 23 For data on Joaquin Ortega, see Michael Cullinane, *Illustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908*. Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003, p. 97.
- 24 In this listing, the same individual who succeeds in occupying both positions is excluded since the person does not qualify as a “political family” as defined in this study. Only families who have at least two different members occupying these positions are included in the table.
- 25 In coding for the turnover rates for governors and representatives, members of the same political family are coded similarly to capture the strength and continuity of these elites. For instance, in a province where the governorship is occupied singly by the same family but by various family members(say spouses or children) at different times throughout the period being studied, the turnover rate is coded as zero. The same coding procedure applies to congressional districts occupied by similarly situated family members.
- 26 The Good Governance Index (GGI) used by the NSCB is computed for each province as the unweighted arithmetic average of the Economic Good Governance Index (EGGI), the Political Good Governance Index (PGGI), and the Administrative Good Governance Index (AGGI) (Virola et al. 2004)
- 27 The reference to Latin America is deliberate and instructive since the Philippines shares some of the most significant features of Latin American political systems especially the tradition of strong presidents, weak legislatures and powerful political families.
- 28 For the historical formation of the Partido Federal and the early years of the Nacionalista Party, see Cullinane (2003) and Ruby R. Paredes, ed., *Philippine Colonial Democracy*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989.
- 29 Six of the candidates of the Democratic Alliance won congressional seats in the 1946 elections but were unseated by the Roxas-led Congress on alleged charges of electoral fraud and terrorism. The DA congresspersons had to be unseated to guarantee the passage of the Parity Amendment in Congress. For a study of the impact of American rule over elite continuity in the Philippines in the aftermath of the 2nd world war, see Rivera (2011).
- 30 In the May 2010 elections, the two biggest left-leaning party list formations, Makabayan and Akbayan, entered into electoral alliances with the major presidential candidates. For a discussion of the working relations between Akbayan and the Liberal Party, see Teehankee 2009.

- 31 Perhaps this should be qualified in the case of incumbent presidents who fear legal sanctions for abuses committed while in office.
- 32 For a recent collection of various works on the Party List System, see, Tuazon 2011.